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The Hamiltonian Paradigm and the
International Securities Market: Reversing
American Industry's Relative Decline in
the Twenty-First Century
Bernard M. Rethore*
How small, of all that human heart's endure, that part
which laws or kings can cause or cure!
Samuel Johnson
I. Introduction
Over the last decade, transnational financial services' and busi-
ness practices 2 have undergone a metamorphosis. Traditional struc-
tures and impediments to conducting international ventures have be-
gun to fall away. The impending opening of borders among
European Economic Community (EEC) 3 nations, the revising of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),4 and, most re-
cently, elimination of trade barriers between the United States and
* General Counsel, McDyre & Spendley, Ltd., Darien, CT; B.A. LeMoyne College 1985;
J.D. The Dickinson School of Law 1988.
I. One author states that:
Recent developments in international trade, production and finance point
toward the potential development of an international market as a means of mo-
bilizing world capital resources more effectively. The greater need for foreign
capital, especially to finance the growth of multinational (as well as national)
opportunities; the continued expansion of international capital markets; the in-
creased interest, affluence, and mobility of individual investors; and the present
inadequacy of many national primary and secondary markets are all factors that
would seem to favor the rise of an international securities market.
H. BLOOMENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION 2-3
(1982) [hereinafter H. BLOOMENTHAL].
2. The Japanese initiated the revolution with their unique approach to employer/em-
ployee relations in manufacturing. Their success spurred response by American industry.
3. EEC member country borders are scheduled to be opened in 1992, allowing free
movement of trade, labor, and capital. For an overview, see The Economist, which ran a five
part series on the future of Europe, 1992, beginning November 19, 1988, and concluding De-
cember 17, 1988.
4. "The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature October 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 50 U.N.T.S. 194 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1984).
The acronym GATT refers to the international body supervising the agreement as well as the
agreement itself." Note, The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure in the 1980s: Where Do
We Go From Here?, 5 DICK. J. INT'L L. 82 (1986).
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Canada,5 have all contributed to this development. In turn, continu-
ing major structural changes in the world's financial markets have
further accelerated growth.' Learning from hindsight,7 money man-
agers deftly juggle risk, innovation, and technology in the bur-
geoning world market. In short, international trade is expanding, and
surplus institutional capital is flowing freely worldwide.8
American industry, however, has been slow to capitalize on the
international market.9 Although there has been a clamor for in-
creased competitiveness, 10 few companies have actually achieved the
new 'world class' status." Most sectors of industry are still forced to
5. Note, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Its Aspects, Highlights, and Proba-
ble Impact on Future Bilateral Trade and Trading Agreements, 7 DICK. J. INT'L L. 371
(1989).
6. Sir Kit McMahon, Chairman and Chief Executive, Midland Bank, explains that:
These fall into three broad categories: the globalization of markets, requir-
ing the servicing of major corporate and institutional customers to be managed
on an international basis; the securitisation of debt at the expense of traditional
banking products; and deregulation in the major financial centres of traditional
practices which had served to limit activity and financial innovation. The net
result has been a massive increase in international capital flows and the diversifi-
cation of the banking industry into the securities market.
McMahon, Foreword, I GLOBAL INVEST. MGMT 3 (Summer 1988) [hereinafter McMahon].
7. Innovation and development carries its share of risk. The collapse of the equity mar-
kets in October, 1987, is a poignant example of this. The market dramatically lost 508 points
on volume of 656,103,730 shares. Pauly, A New Invisible Hand, NEWSWEEK Nov. 2, 1987, at
21. Many people in the securities industry complained that the program traders had been
responsible for the market twitching in such a volatile manner, resulting in the destruction of
billions of dollars of wealth. Mintz, Who? What? Where? When? How? Questions About the
Crash No One Asked But Should Have, BARRONS Nov. 2, 1987, at 26. In short, the October
collapse of stock prices caused New York financial pundits and Washington policymakers to
scramble in search of a single, simple solution. Despite the setback, globalization, securitiza-
tion, and deregulation advances have transformed traditional domestic understandings of the
international movement and management of funds.
8. McMahon, supra note 6, at 3. Some argue that this occurs naturally given the effi-
cient capital market theory. This premise states that the market is efficient when prices reflect
all available information. Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory
and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STANFORD L. REV. 1031 (1977). In short,
prices reflect informational efficiency to facilitate allocational efficiency of capital resources to
the most profitable investment. Id. at 1037.
9. This sluggish approach is primarily due to the manner by which industry is bur-
dened by government. See infra section entitled The Past Fifty Years - Excessive Govern-
ment Intervention. Alternatively, see Kotkin & Kishimoto, THE THIRD CENTURY: AMERICA'S
RESURGENCY IN THE ASIAN ERA (1989), which argues that America's constant immigration
infusion and open society may succeed over the insular and xenophobic culture of Japan.
10. One commentator, describing America's inability to be competitive, writes that:
[tihe recent dramatic drops in stock markets worldwide have raised doubts
about America's economic future. A central question arising from this lack of
confidence: Is the United States facing a crisis in its ability to compete in the
world? Many Americans would say yes. They view the United States merchan-
dise trade deficit, which reached $170 billion in 1986 and $78 billion in the first
half of 1987, as good reason for concern about America's economic future. Some
mistakenly see the trade deficit as a problem in itself and advocate protectionist
policies as the remedy. Others see it as the symptom of deeper problems, of the
inability of American businesses to compete against foreign counterparts.
MAKING AMERICA MORE COMPETITIVE I (E. Hudgins, ed. 1987) [hereinafter Hudgins].
I1. The concept of "world class" manufacturing was articulated by Richard
Schoenberger. He explains that:
world class manufacturing depends on blended management - rather than
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compete despite the heavy hand of government via law and regula-
tion. 12 But, the tradition of Hamiltonian thought on the relationship
of republican government to commercial activity can provide a pri-
mer on how to capitalize on the economic renaissance encouraged by
the financial markets-moving from the twentieth century paradigm
of interventionist politics (and economics)' 3 back toward the eight-
eenth century model of purposeful 4 government involvement that
encourages the prosperity of commerce-that is, regulatory reduc-
tions both in finance and industry.1
This article discusses the eighteenth century understanding of
the subtle equilibrium between polity, economy, and government (as
manifest in legislation and regulation); 6 the deliterious effect of the
laissez-faire heterodoxy that entrenched itself during the nineteenth
century; and, the adverse reaction that occurred in the twentieth
century. In turn, this article shifts its inquiry toward the internation-
alization of world financial markets as a guide for how United States
industry can reclaim its patrimony: by encouraging a re-adoption of
domination by a separate group of managers - which marshals resources for
continual rapid movement. To achieve world class status, companies must
change procedures and concepts, which in turn leads to recasting relations
among suppliers, purchasers, producers, and customers. Employee involvement
and interaction, both on the shop floor and in the decision-making/problem solv-
ing process, is key. (And,) making maximum use of people and current machin-
ery is a company's first priority; (upgrading automation), if necessary, should
come much later.
R. SCHOENBERGER, WORLD CLASS MANUFACTURING i (1986).
12. For instance, the United States Government continues to complicate the field of em-
ployee compensation, pension and benefits with additional regulations. Consider the record
keeping requirements on small businesses demanded by section 89 as evidence of this strain,
and the current swell of public opinion to have it repealed.
13. Economics has been substituted as an end in and of itself, with social values bowing
to the new deity of commercial impulses, rather than the more logical approach of economic
arrangements "facilitating and encouraging more rudimentary communal ends." Zoll, The
Conservative Metamorphosis, INTERCOLLEGIATE REV. 3, 7 (Spring 1988) [hereinafter Zoll].
More simply, social values, whatever the community deems them to be, should be the catalyst
behind economic enterprises. Recently, however, social objectives have been cast in light of
their "efficacy by their compatibility with economic theory." Id. "At times, theories about how
to economically facilitate social ends become invested with a spurious autonomous legitimacy
or authority that eventually reverses the process and the economic paradigm, ostensibly utilita-
rian, becomes the formative conceptions of the social order." Id. Those goals that pass muster
rise to the forefront and "replace those essentially axiological in nature. In short, a theological
and ethical orthodoxy is retired in favor of an economic one." Id.
14. The author chooses this term of art to illustrate the concept that change must be
purposeful rather than occurring simply for the sake of change itself. Indeed, there is virtue in
inaction, and conservation; appreciation must occur well before alteration.
15. More abstractly, this entails a realignment of enterprise association with civil associ-
ation. In other words, the diverse objectives of the community no longer have an adequate
framework that expressly delineates the extent to which members may conduct their individual
pursuits of liberty. Sobran, Pensees: Notes for the Reactionary of Tomorrow, Nat'l. Rev. 23,
30 (Dec. 31, 1985) [hereinafter Sobran].
16. The connection between polity and economy was originally postulated by Miller,
The Constitution and the Spirit of Commerce, How CAPITALISTIC IS THE CONSTITUTION (R.
Goldwin & W. Schambra eds. 1982) [hereinafter Miller]. Miller's thesis is provocative and
provides the foundation for the 18th century formula presented infra.
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the eighteenth century model of the proper balance between govern-
ment and commerce. Finally, using the example provided by the
move toward an international financial market, this article concludes
that if this reclamation occurs, it may allow industry in the United
States to participate beneficially in the burgeoning international
market of the twenty-first century.
II. Understanding the Evolution of the Competing Paradigms
A. Introduction-Origin of the Formula
To understand the concept of the interrelationship between soci-
ety and economy, an outline of the historical underpinnings of the
socioeconomic formula is necessary. The Federalists 17 cast at the an-
vil a cohesive civil and enterprise association 18 in the form of republi-
can government, which held liberty as the ideal." James Madison
recognized that throughout history democracies "have ever been
spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incom-
patible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in
general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their
death."' 20 In short, they "bred the related diseases of majority fac-
tions and violent factions, both of which could bring about the de-
struction of liberty. '1 The Federalists boldly set out to reconcile this
problem. One commentator, Stephen Miller, writes that according to
Hamilton:
[Tihe science of politics offered a remedy that would re-
duce the possibility of majority faction and violent faction with-
out subverting liberty. The remedy, of course, was a political
one-the creation of a strong national government-but it was
also an economic one; this republic would become strong and
stable only if it were a predominately commercial polity. For the
central conclusion of those who advocated a science of politics
was that only in predominately commercial polities could liberty
17. For an extensive overview, see generally SAVING THE REVOLUTION (C. Kesler, ed.
1987).
18. See supra note 15.
19. Supported and maintained by the rule of law, "a great common enterprise" was
constructed to facilitate "that primacy of private life" - i.e. individual liberty. Sobran, supra
note 15, at 30.
20. Miller, supra note 16, at 150 (quoting THE FEDERALIST, No. 10, at 81 (J. Madison)
(1982 ed.)).
21. Id. Madison defined factions on November 22, 1787, in a letter to the people of New
York. He wrote:
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some com-
mon impulse of passion, or of interest adverse to the rights of other citizens, or
to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
THE FEDERALIST, No. 10, at 43 (J. Madison) (1982 ed.).
[Vol. 8:1
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flourish without leading to violent civil discord.12
"The ideal of majoritarian government (then) was to provide a rule
of law approximating, as closely as possible, unanimous consent."2
Thus, it was with this understanding that a formula of government,
which balanced polity24 and economy, was forged and the Constitu-
tion framed as a means of preserving democracy.
B. The Eighteenth Century Paradigm
The formula is founded upon the principle that the expansion of
commerce would result in political stability, reducing the natural
propensity of democratic government to commit suicide through in-
ternal discord caused by violent factions.2 5 The interdependence be-
tween the stability of government and its separate, outside commer-
cial pursuits, although seemingly incongruent, enables democracy
and liberty to flourish while holding in abeyance those vexatious ele-
ments of society.2" Commercial expansion, therefore, maintains a
stable society. Conversely, a secure polity encourages increased com-
mercial development. The tie that binds the two together is the na-
tional government. It can either encourage or discourage the pros-.
perity of commerce2 7 by the type and extent of the restrictions it
22. Miller, supra note 16, at 151.
23. Sobran, supra note 15, at 30. "The Framers were concerned not to let the 51 per
cent push the 49 per cent around. They provided filtering devices in the hope that factional
interests would cancel each other out, even in the event that 'republican virtue' - civic mind-
edness - failed to check them." Id. "Consensus is not always possible, but it is something to
aim for, and some scholars argue that even Rousseau's 'general will' envisioned the state not as
a vehicle of popular passion but, on the contrary, as an institution that would be restricted by
consensus." Id.
24. Polity is an amorphous concept. It includes, inter alia, a society's collective, cumula-
tive conscience, and embraces its nascent mores.
25. One commentator explains that:
Property and diversity were essential parts of the Federalist solution to the
problem of popular government. Republics throughout history, the Federalist
knew, had been torn asunder by the bitter struggle of political factions formed
around opposing ideologies or around extreme inequalities of wealth. The Ameri-
can republic would escape that fate; a citizenry interested, above all, in the ac-
quisition of property or wealth would have little time for ideological disputation
or patience with it. And a modern commercial nation, organized for the acquisi-
tion of property and thus characterized by the division of labor, would be frag-
mented into such a diversity or "multiplicity of interests" that the great, fatal
struggle of rich and poor would be averted. But commerce requires large mar-
kets, and large markets require "a great extent of territory"-sufficiently great
that an energetic national government is necessary for its administration. The
problem of fatal republican division, The Federalist argued, would not arise in
the large commercial republic, administered by an energetic national
government.
Schambra, The Roots of the American Public Philosophy, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A NEW
PARTNERSHIP FOR THE REPUBLIC 19, 21 (R. Hawkins, Jr. ed. 1983) [hereinafter Roots of
Public Philosophy].
26. Miller, supra note 16, at 150.
27. Hamilton explains in THE FEDERALIST No. 12 that "the prosperity of commerce is
now perceived and acknowledged by all enlightened statesman to be the most useful as well as
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issues. Therefore, the formula may be stated as democracy equals a
healthy polity plus a progressive economy less government restric-
tions (intervention).28
C. Application of the Eighteenth Century Model
Republican government is predicated on the ideal that citizens
should be free to pursue their own passions.2 19 Government is charged
with the responsibility of maintaining an environment that reconciles
the broader communal objectives with individual definitions. Simply,
this entails acting as a steward; that is, providing the opportunity for
the pursuit of private liberty.
In the eighteenth century, government stewardship generally
took its lead from the free market; but there were times when those
principles were deemed inappropriate or irreconcilable with the com-
munity-defined ideal."0 Indeed, government intervention in com-
merce was desirable when it could bestow a benefit on the polity as a
whole by mitigating the detrimental effects of commercial
expansion.a"
the most productive source of national wealth and has accordingly become a primary object of
their political cares." THE FEDERALIST, No. 12, at 160 (A. Hamilton) (1982 ed.).
28. The equation is stated as such: Democracy = Polity+ Economy - Restrictions. The
polity component is basically constant with only slight variations in national sentiment that
naturally occur over time. It includes both the decentralized values of a particular locality and
the centralized interests of the nation. Likewise, the economy component is also fairly con-
stant. Economy, although it is defined by basic communal goals, is not subject to the ephem-
eral upward or downward fluctuations experienced by the nation throughout the year. Instead,
it represents the broader philosophical pursuit of wealth, generally called capitalism in the
United States, and more particularly, a progressive economy focused on producers and con-
sumers. Finally, the last component is the single element subject to extreme variations. Simply
stated, the greater the restrictions, the less room is available for economic expansion. This
decreases the stability of the polity as people shift the focus of their attention from the pursuit
of wealth toward the actions of government; from these roots, factions ferment and grow. On
the contrary, when restrictions are relatively small, the economy is able to forge ahead as
quickly as the producers and consumers can carry it, thus strengthening the stability of society
by reducing the tendency of the populace to organize into factions, since they are again con-
centrated on their individual pursuits of liberty.
29. McDonald, The Constitution and Hamiltonian Capitalism, How CAPITALISTIC IS
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 72 [hereinafter McDonald]. This idea is premised on the
understanding that "private vices" (self interest) derive "publick benefits" (the development
and operation of society) as ordered social structures, such as law and language, naturally
result from individual pursuits. Mandeville, THE FABLE OF THE BEES (reprinted 1989) [herein-
after Mandeville].
30. Miller, supra note 16, at 161.
31. In essence, purposeful legislation checked polity and economy. It is important to
appreciate the persuasive effect of government intervention.
The 19th century pure laissez-faire approach to government upset the intricate balance, as
will be discussed infra. It allowed the economy to proceed headlong without either communally
defined objectives or legislatively prescribed parameters.
Today, the impact of a developed democratic government on society is even more pro-
nounced, as discussed infra. Simply, government affects economy whether it issues regulations
or not. The manner by which it spends yields a certain degree of symmetry. One commentator
explains that:
Merely by having fiscal and monetary policies and a budget, government
has a profound effect on economic life. To choose certain policies rather than
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To accomplish this endeavor, Madison argued, that government
had to be a disinterested, strong national legislature. 32 He reasoned
that "it becomes every Government to lean rather to a confidence in
the judgment of individuals, than to interpositions controlling the
free exercise of it."" s But Madison also recognized that excessive or
exiguous regulation would impede the prosperity of commerce. This
was a narrow tight-rope to walk, yet one he believed a vigilant legis-
lature could adequately navigate.34 The government's objective was
to maintain symmetry between too much and too little. And, under
the equation, the restrictive variable operates on the theory that un-
desirable individual economic pursuits could be tempered by a gov-
ernment of purposeful laws. 5
others, and to spend $750 billion in certain ways rather than other ways, is to
choose to shape the economy in specific ways. The one choice no government
has, least of all a welfare estate in a developed democracy, is nonintervention.
Indeed, the word "intervention" suggests zanily, that the state exists somehow
outside the economy, rather than being woven into its fabric. The public sector
is, after all, a sector of the economy.
G. WILL, THE NEW SEASON 67 (1987).
32. James Madison's idea of the role of the Senate was as a "trustee" of the governed.
Under such stewardship, national interests should be protected from unpurposeful change. By
its very nature, "the Senate's national perspective enables it to elevate the character of domes-
tic legislation. Senators have substantial latitude to attend to the general good, rather than act
merely as ambassadors of provincial interests." Landi, Madison's Political Thought, 6 POL.
Sci. REVIEWER 72, 92, 103 (1976). Theoretically, legislators are in the best position to ascer-
tain when public interest necessitates restrictions on commerce to provide for "the safety and
prosperity of the nation." Miller, supra note 16, at 161 (quoting THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER:
SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 485 (Meyers, ed. 1973)).
33. Miller, supra note 16 at 161.
34. Justice Antonin Scalia posited that the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment
(direct election of senators by the electorate rather than appointment by a state legislature)
seriously jeopardizes the effectiveness of a state check on the federal government. Remarks
before the Federalist Society meeting at Villanova University School of Law, Fall 1988.
W.B. Allen explains that there were two explicit reasons "to include the states in their
political capacity in the formation of the government." Allen, Justice and the General Good:
Federalist 51, SAVING THE REVOLUTION 138 (C. Kesler, ed.) (1987). He writes that:
[slo far as this may expose the Union 'to the possibility of injury from the
State legislatures, it is an evil; but it is an evil which could not have been
avoided . . . . If this had been done it would doubtless have been interpreted
into an entire dereliction of the federal principle, and would certainly have de-
prived the State governments of that absolute safeguard which they will enjoy
under this provision." [Federalist 59, at 364 (1961 ed.)].
As for the second (reason), one need only consult the histories of Rome,
Sparta, and Carthage to discover the value of some body that will provide stabil-
ity in a government all too prone to momentary passions. "The cool and deliber-
ate sense" of the people must ever serve as a command for their representatives
and agents; but the latter (Senate) must always reflect just such sense rather
than the spontaneous rages of the people. To this real advantage it is necessary
to add "auxiliary precautions," in the form of balances and checks and the sepa-
ration of powers [Federalist 63].
Id.
35. McDonald, supra note 29, at 72. McDonald elucidates that:
The Constitution and the Hamiltonian system of political economy embod-
ied these two principles in America's fundamental law. Now, the idea of funda-
mental law can be understood most readily if one conceives of political and eco-
nomic activity as games played in accordance with rules: Fundamental law is the
rule book, defining the objects of the game and specifying how it is to be played.
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The economic element of the equation is also noteworthy. It is
premised on the understanding that the pursuit of individual wealth
is predicated on the ability to satisfy others." "As Adam Smith put
it, 'It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the
baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard of their own
interests.' "31 Society is best served if all of its members are free" to
pursue their individual dreams without unnecessary intervention. As
the Mandeville Essays describe in THE FABLE OF THE BEES, social
structures are a spontaneous growth developing out of individual
human actions.3 9 Thus, the paramount goal of a stable democracy is
realized when there is a balance between social ends, commercial
pursuits and government restrictions.
D. Laying the Groundwork for the Fall from Paradise-the Nine-
teenth Century Paradigm
During the nineteenth century, the Hamiltonian model was
abandoned in favor of a new paradigm."0 Advocates argued that the
government should not interfere in the pursuit of individual wealth.
And, industry should not be allowed to ask government for favors.41
Yet, what these "reformers" were really encouraging were en-
trepreneurial activities that inhibited competition and economic
growth via monopoly. 42 Over time, the prosperity facilitated by
eighteenth century commercial practices stagnated. The laissez-faire
government's refusal to act purposefully (as it had in the previous
century) led to the elimination of purposeful government action as a
The Constitution was the rule book for government, the Hamiltonian system for
the economy.
id.
36. Id. at 72.
37. Id. at 72 (quoting A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 15 (1961 ed.)).
38. Joseph Sobran explains that liberty in the ancient world was predicated on "special
status; hardly anyone imagined it as potentially universal, let alone as a 'natural right.' "
Sobran, supra note 15, at 28. By contrast, modern Western society somehow feels morally
compelled to extend civic membership to "every competent individual." Id. But, as Henry Jaffe
notes, "the Founding Fathers used the words 'free' and 'equal' as synonyms." Id. Sobran
writes that:
they didn't think there was any "tension" between the two things, but, on
the contrary, thought that the two things were really one. Men were free in
being equal and equal in being free, as Locke had put it, from being subject to
the arbitrary will of anyone else, monarch or slaveowner.
id.
39. Mandeville, supra note 29.
40. Miller, supra note 16, at 161.
41. Id. at 162.
42. Id. For example, this is easily visible by the manner in which John D. Rockefeller
built the Standard Oil Company in the late 1870-80's or the method by which Andrew Car-
negie developed the steel industry. Monopolies, however, are inefficient. See generally R. Pos-
NER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3rd ed.) (1987) and J. BOBER, INTERMEDIATE PRICE AND
INCOME THEORY, chapters 8 & 9 (1955). Moreover, the deterioration that occurred during the
19th century resulted in private sector inefficiency.
[Vol. 8:1
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principal stabilizing force."3
Samuel Eliot Morison"" characterized the early nineteenth cen-
tury as "America's busy age."' 5 By mid-century, industrialization
was occurring at a rapid pace."' By century's end, it became the age
of trusts and monopolies, and "cutthroat competition in which the
big fish swallowed the little fish and then tried to eat one another.
'4 7
As Morison observes, "these expectations and abuses were long tol-
erated by Americans, so imbued were they with laissez-faire doc-
trine, so proud of progress, improvement, and development, and so
averse to increasing the power of government."48 Unfortunately, the
lesson of purposeful government intervention 9 to balance unfettered
individual economic pursuits with broader communal objectives was
lost on succeeding generations.50 In short, civil association surren-
43. Martin Lipton discusses the generational corporate governance debate, by address-
ing what he characterizes as the "third stage of corporatism, the age of finance corporatism."
This era is dominated by the institutional investor and professional investment manager. Al-
though his definition of early corporatism is not as broad as the Hamiltonian paradigm dis-
cussed supra, Lipton's articulation of the first stage of corporatism in the nineteenth century is
illuminating, especially in terms of the transformation that the economy endures during the
period.
He writes that:
Corporate governance (initially) posed few internal or external concerns for
society. Most businesses were essentially local. Corporate managers were elected
by, and responsible to, a concerned and cohesive body of stockholders. Despite
the rise of general incorporation, most states retained strict limits on the size and
scope of corporate activity.
During the final quarter of the nineteenth century, states began to remove
restrictions on corporate size, and it became permissible to incorporate "for any
lawful purpose." Corporations grew in power and complexity. Local opinion and
the invisible hand of the marketplace were no longer sufficient to ensure social
well-being. On the state level, public utility commissions were created to regu-
late the rates and services of natural monopolies. Congress passed the Interstate
Commerce Act to regulate the railroads, and the Sherman and Clayton Acts to
preserve the benefits of competition.
Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5
(1987) [hereinafter Lipton]. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Del-
aware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 664 (1974); H. FAULKNER, THE DECLINE OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE (1951),
and I. COCHRAN, AGE OF ENTERPRISE (1949). Growth occurred, but often at the expense of
the rest of the polity.
44. Morison, twice a Pulitzer Prize winner, was an historian and biographer. S. Morison,
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1965) [hereinafter Morison].
45. Id. at 470.
46. Id. at 468-84.
47. Id. at 762. One commentator cynically.noted that:
At this period Americans found they could, by the experience of a daring
and cunning of a peculiar, reckless and low order, so take advantage of the laws
of the land and its economic customs as to create for themselves wealth, or the
equivalent, money, to practically an unlimited extent, without the aid of time or
labor or the possession of any unusual ability coming through birth or education.
Id. at 763, (quoting T. LAWSON, FRENZIED FINANCE (1905)).
48. Id. at 764.
49. Morison notes that there was an inherent confusion as to whether the States or the
Federal government was responsible for regulation, especially since States issued corporate
charters. Id. at 764; see also Kennedy, Federalism and the Force of History, How FEDERAL
IS THE CONSTITUTION 74, 75 (1983); and Lipton, supra note 43.
50. "Theodore Roosevelt well summed up this last quarter of the nineteenth century in
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dered to enterprise association.
Since government was rejected by the nineteenth century para-
digm, the emphasis was in turn placed on economy, altering the bal-
ance between naturally competing, but mutually dependent, ele-
ments. In essence, social values no longer provided a basic premise
for either government or individual action, and economics became
the end. Some commentators explain that economic liberty was con-
fused with political liberty, as the good of the whole was subrogated
to individual exploitation. 1 Since economic pursuits increased, and
government intervention decreased, polity was simply overwhelmed.
In sum, the laissez-faire mercantilism of the 1800's resulted in cor-
porate dominance and trusts late in the century, which conceived the
modern interventionist state born during the next century. 2
E. The Past Fifty Years-Excessive Government Intervention
The growth of industry and at a time of very limited govern-
ment involvement set the stage for a change to a new era of econom-
ics-and, a new paradigm. One commentator summarizes the histor-
ical events leading up to the polarization that occurred in the 1930's.
He writes that:
In the United States, the mercantilism of 1800 yielded to
the laissez-faire of relatively small firms in the age of Jackson
and Lincoln. This in turn was largely replaced by corporate con-
centration and trusts by the turn of the (19th) century, though
the political gospel of laissez-faire continued to dominate both
the Constitution, particularly as expounded by the Supreme
Court, and the political process until the Great Depression and
the advent of the New Deal . . . .Finally, with the arrival of
the New Deal, the modern interventionists' state gradually came
into full being, producing the political capitalism with which we
are so familiar today.
53
Government's role grew rapidly in three short decades and by
his Autobiography: 'A root of individualistic materialism, under which complete freedom for
the individual . . turned out in practice to mean perfect freedom for the strong to wrong the
weak . . . .The power of the mighty industrial overlord . . . had increased with giant strides,
while the methods of controlling them, . . . through the Government, remained archaic and
therefore practically impotent.'" Morison, supra note 44, at 764.
51. Miller, supra note 16, at 162.
52. McDonald, supra note 29, at 76. Lipton calls this the second stage of corporatism.
He writes that:
[this development] spawned regulation designed to promote corporate re-
sponsibility to investors and to society at large. Congress passed the federal se-
curities laws in order to promote corporate responsibility to owners of the corpo-
ration. Congress then extended corporate responsibility by addressing the needs
of labor, consumers, and communities, through a variety of legislation.
Lipton, supra note 43, at 4-5.
53. McDonald, supra note 29, at 76.
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the 1960's, Forrest McDonald explains that:
[the federal government] launched a massive all-out effort
to extend the American system of political economy far beyond
the limits of what was possible. The fruits of these efforts, be-
sides a general loss of faith in the system when the efforts failed,
were a Supreme Court that legislates rather than adjudicates
and a metastrasized federal bureaucracy. The Court, driven by a
mindless compulsion to legislate equality, has changed not just
the rules but the very object of [the] government [component of
the socioeconomic formula], which was to provide as much indi-
vidual liberty as is compatible with public safety. [Moreover],
the bureaucracy, driven by a mindless compulsion to run every-
thing, has changed not just the rules but the very objective of
the econom[ic] [element of the formula], which was private pur-
suit of personal gain. Into the bargain it has all but abolished
the idea that rewards should be commensurate with effort as
measured by values set in marketplace. Government regulations
are leading inexorably to zero economic growth (a goal that a
number of bureaucratic agencies actively espouse)."'
Now, special interest legislation replaces community consensus to fill
the void left by the previous century's government inactvity.55 But,
"far from creating trust in government, the expansion of the con-
cerns of government has bred distrust and resentment."' 8 Liberty,
54. McDonald, supra note 29, at 73. Support for this sentiment abounds between the
covers of many books. Perhaps the seminal work on the subject is R. WEAVER, IDEAS HAVE
CONSEQUENCES (1948), which discusses America's impending dilemma. See also R. MCDON-
ALD, THE PHAETON RIDE: THE RISE OF CRISIS OF AMERICAN SUCCESS (1974); W. SIMON, A
TIME FOR TRUTH (1978); W. BUCKLEY, RIGHT REASON (1987); D. RAVEL, WHY DEMOCRA-
CIES PERISH (1986), and the collected writings of Russell Kirk.
55. Democracy's original "revulsion against arbitrary government" has been lost in the
cosmos. Sobran, supra note 15, at 30. Bruno Leoni explains that:
[tihe new meaning of legislation corresponds not to a "common" will, that
is, a will that may be presumed as existent in all citizens, but to the expression
of the particular will of certain individuals and groups who were lucky enough to
have a contingent majority of legislators on their side at a given moment ....
Legislation has come to resemble more and more a sort of Dicktat that the win-
ning majorities in the legislative assemblies impose upon the minorities, often
with the result of overturning long-established individual expectations and creat-
ing completely unprecedented ones. Furthermore, legislation may have and actu-
ally has in many cases today a negative effect on the very efficiency of the rules
and on the homogeneity of the feelings and convictions already prevailing in a
given society. Instead of promoting stability, as a general law does, interest
bound legislation undermines it.
Id.
56. Miller, supra note 16, at 163. One author notes that:
Of course intrusiveness is in the eye of the beholder. One person's intrusive-
ness is another person's governmental vigilance on behalf of justice. But millions
of Americans found intrusive and intolerable such government actions as forced
busing to achieve racial balance, mandatory reverse discrimination (a.k.a. "af-
firmative action") including hiring and firing quotas that overrode seniority
claims, the minute supervision of businesses by bureaucratic administrations of
occupational safety and health regulations, the supplanting of community stan-
dards by national requirements regarding regulation of pornography, the over-
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which is central to maintaining democracy and the republic, has
been whittled away. The delicate balance between polity and econ-
omy has been put in further jeopardy.5"
The rise of "inflated legislation" has distorted the public "un-
derstanding of the character of law." 68 Instead of being a mecha-
nism by which to maintain and support the polity's goals as con-
ceived by Madison, it is now used to provide both motive and
values."9
"Ideally," Aristotle said, "there should be few laws seldom
changed."60 In the American Republic, commands 61 have supplanted
communal laws;" and, well-intended regulations have been super-
seded by excessive regulation.6" Civil association dominates enter-
prise association. Although this is not an absolute, even those "regu-
lations (that) achieve legitimate goals" cause "inefficiencies, adding
turning of fifty state judgments concerning the regulation of abortion, the ban-
ning of voluntary school prayer in public schools, the banning of even a minute
of silence in public schools (lest a pupil lapse into an unconstitutional frame of
mind), judicial fine-tuning of public displays of religious symbols, and on and on
and on. No particular intrusion offended everyone, or even a majority. But the
accumulation of aggrieved minorities produced a national mood.
G. WILL, supra note 31, at 85.
57. One critic explains that:
Government regulation has profoundly affected the climate in which mod-
ern business must operate. Complex and sometimes contradictory regulation re-
quire large expenditures of time and money and make it increasingly difficult for
business to act. The opportunity is ripe for business to take the initiative ...
and change many aspects of its relationship with government, but if it loses this
opportunity there will be grave consequences for the future of private enterprise
and our democratic society as a whole.
J. DIEBOLD. THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN SOCIETY 57, 58 (1982)
hereinafter J. DIEBOLD].
58. Sobran, supra note 15, at 28.
59. Id. at 31.
60. Id. at 28. Sobran writes that:
this is so for several reasons. One is that those laws are best that require
least enforcement - laws that are rooted in the moral habits of the citizens, and
enjoy the citizens' respect for their permanence. Another is that it is a general
function of rules, tacit or explicit, to make social life predictable. If law is unpre-
dictable, it loses its appropriate character. Moreover, positive law should have
the quality of seeming to be discovered or elicited from tacit moral understand-
ing commonly shared, rather than imposed by an effort of will. The very nature
of civil equality makes it wrong for one part of the community use legislation as
the instrument of its own special interests; to do that is to make the rest of the
community to some degree subject to the arbitrary will of those who control the
legislature - a circumstance the Framers of the Constitution were anxious to
avoid, though the techniques of factional politics have outwitted their careful
arrangements over the years.
id.
61. "Commands are positive expressions of will. They leave no alternatives." Id. at 29.
62. "Laws are impersonal rules, general, disinterested, usually negative in form. They
don't specify what substantive actions we are to perform, but merely attach 'adverbial condi-
tions' to whatever courses of action we may happen to choose. Laws are 'observed,' commands
are obeyed.' To live under the rule of law is to be a citizen, to live under commandment is to
be subject." Id.
63. Hudgins, supra note 10, at 29.
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needless cost to United States business." '64 And, from a purely eco-
nomic vantage, the "state's substantive purpose" has stifled growth
and opportunity, threatening the long-term economic health of the
nation .
65
Moreover, "the ability of United States industry to adjust to
varying domestic and international patterns of demand, supply, and
prices (in the twenty-first century) will depend on the flexibility of
the United States economy. "Flexibility is served by reforming those
government policies that distort the market and add needlessly to the
cost of doing business, and discourage risk taking and innovation.""6
64. For example, John Diebold writes that:
It all started in 1887, when the U.S. Congress began to pass laws requiring
federal government regulation of business. The state governments followed. As is
always the case when governments get involved, the regulations and the agencies
keep on growing. In the past decade, they have run rampant. During this dec-
ade, we have: (1) created one new major federal regulatory agency each year;
(2) increased from seven percent to 30 percent the percentage of GNP repre-
sented by regulated industries; (3) increased the number of pages of new govern-
ment regulations of business from 10,000 in 1970 to 70,000 in 1977; and (4)
established 43 pages of regulations for even the "voluntary wages and price con-
trols." The cost of this regulation ran at the rate of approximately $100 billion
last year (1981).
There has been a considerable loss of public confidence in all institutions.
United States public confidence in business was down to 22 percent in 1978 from
55 percent in 1966. Confidence in big government has also dropped from 41
percent in 1966 to 14 percent in 1978.
J. DIEBOLD, supra note 57, at 60-1.
65. Hudgins, supra note 10, at II. William A. Niskanen notes that:
Federal spending data reflect a massive change in the federal role in the
postwar period. From fiscal year 1947 through fiscal year 1976, total spending
for national defense, international affairs, veterans, and interest increased at an
annual rate of six percent. Total federal spending for all other functions in-
creased at an annual rate of about 13 percent. Federal spending for the other
functions increased from about 17 percent of total federal outlays to about 58
percent of the (1976) budget. Most of this current federal spending does not
have an explicit constitutional basis in the enumerated powers. Moreover, this
spending data does not reflect the large federal lending program or the addition
of federal regulatory powers affecting product and occupational safety and uses
of the environment.
Niskanen, Public Policy and the Political Process, GOVERNMENTAL CONTROLS AND THE FREE
MARKET 78 (Pejovich, ed. 1976).
66. Hudgins, supra note 10, at II. He argues that reform of government and trade
regulation should, inter alia, include:
I. Tightening the Freedom of Information Act to ensure the confidentiality of
U.S. Trade Secrets.
2. Setting reasonable standards and liability limits for product liability suits.
3. Streamlining the export licensing process.
4. Repealing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
5. Removing all "voluntary" quota restrictions and dismantle all U.S. enforced
cartels that restrict suppliers of goods and raw materials in the U.S.
6. Avoiding domestic content legislation.
7. Requiring the U.S. Trade Representative's office to issue annual reports on
U.S. trade restrictions.
8. Beginning negotiations with the European Community for bilateral phasing
out of agriculture subsidies.
9. Instructing U.S. representatives to international economic organizations to
oppose policies to close foreign markets.
10. Creating free trade areas with countries that seek totally open markets.
66 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 8:1
In sum, here is what has resulted: government no longer establishes
guidelines that state the parameters for the individual pursuit of lib-
erty; the rule of law, which in theory should support and maintain
the common enterprise, now sets motives and values; social values no
longer provide the catalyst to economic enterprise and have been re-
placed by an economic orthodoxy; excessive regulation impedes the
prosperity of commerce; and symmetry is not maintained by a gov-
ernment of purposeful laws. There is, however, a primer available
under the tutelage of the international securities market.
III. Securities and Internationalization: Means to an End
The "internationalization of the securities market" 7 is a generic
concept that describes two principal understandings: "It can mean
the internationalization of the 'primary' 8 markets or it can mean the
internationalization of 'secondary' 9 trading."7 0 Multinational trad-
Id. at 13-15. (Additionally, this comprehensive study puts forth an eight plank competitiveness
platform designed to promote economic growth. Each of the eight planks contributes to the
primary goal of maintaining the advantages of the market system and eliminating counter-
productive government practices. The above list is only a selection from those specific propos-
als for reform outlined by the eight planks.) Id.
67. One author describes what is meant by an international market. He explains that:
[S]ecurities, both debt and equity, increasingly are being offered for sale on
a multinational basis. In addition, they are being traded actively in more than
one market throughout the world. Institutional investors, in particular, have be-
come very interested in actively trading securities, both foreign and domestic,
because they are looking for economic opportunities worldwide and they hope to
reduce investment risk through worldwide strategies . . . .What, however, has
caused the greatest interest in international trading has been the recent surge in
equities . . . .Issuers, in particular, want to raise capital worldwide on an inex-
pensive, easy and quick basis . . . . Institutional investors, particularly in the
United States, (pension funds)-have gotten into the foreign securities market
with a vengeance . . . .One of the most important developments in bringing
this about is simply the advances in technology. If one can readily access numer-
ous liquid markets, and know immediately what is happening in other markets
around the world, one has a significant trading advantage. If there is a buyer
somewhere willing to buy, and a seller somewhere willing to sell at the same
time of day, and technology provides the ability to reach that buyer and seller
efficiently, it is a transaction that today can be made.
Ketels, An Overview of International Trading, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. I1 (1986) [hereinafter
Ketels].
68. The primary market is a closed transaction, where the initial offering is conducted
by the offerer to investors. In essence, this transaction centers on the issuance of securities and
is the principle means by which companies generate capital. Generally, an underwriter or an
underwriting syndicate will purchase the entire package at a discount, and then attempt to
resell the securities at face or better on the secondary market, discussed infra. These firms
make their money on the difference in the spread between the discount and market price. In
transnational offerings, the process is basically the same, subject to the varying specific rules
that govern issuance on each foreign exchange.
69. The secondary market is where the underwriter sells securities on the open market.
After his initial sale, the shares are traded back and forth between investors through brokers.
In essence, this transaction only involves trading and not issuance. For example, this is the
type of transaction that an individual utilizes to purchase shares on any American stock ex-
change. Internationally, it represents the listing of stock in more than one country.
70. Lorenz, EEC Law and Other problems in Applying the SEC Proposal on Multina-
tional Offerings to the U.K., 21 INT'L LAWYER 795 (1987) [hereinafter Lorenz].
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ing of securities is a means by which institutional investors diversify
their portfolios to spread their risk and capitalize on a foreign mar-
ket.71 The international securities market is, in essence, the eight-
eenth century model in microcosm. By its very nature, it encom-
passes the formula of democracy equals polity plus economy less
restrictions, but in a financial sense. The only portion of the equation
that changes is the substitution of "international market" for "de-
mocracy. ' 72 The competing interests are the same, only the objective
has changed. In short, the example of multinational trading of secur-
ities provides is reminiscent of our national origins, of government
cast on the anvil by expediency tempered by prescription and tradi-
tion. Before continuing further, it would be profitable to digress
somewhat, and examine the continuing evolution of the international
securities market more closely before moving the inquiry to the more
lofty heights of a revived theorem of government.
A. Advent of the Continuous Market
The process of integrating the major capital markets of the
world is moving securities trading toward an unified, continuous
market. "The proliferation of modern information systems and other
technological advances" has been the impetus behind the "growth of
the international market."7 " This has resulted in "the ability to con-
summate transactions without coming under scrutiny of various reg-
ulatory authorities," which, in part, stimulates additional growth.74
An ongoing financial revolution or liberalization policy has been oc-
curring throughout the world.75
71. Merloe, Internationalization of Securities Markets: A Critical Survey of U.S. and
EEC Disclosure Requirements, 8 J. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 249, 251 (1986) [hereinafter
Merloel. See generally Thomas, The Internationalization of the Securities Markets: An Em-
pirical Analysis, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 155 (1982).
72. The perils are virtually the same for either democracy or the international market.
The formula's basic premise is not altered: only by balancing polity, economy and government
will democracy flourish. The same reasoning is applicable to the international securities mar-
ket. Without balancing the competing national interests to preserve the various international
ones, the market will lose its liquidity, national factions will bred, which could bring about the
destruction of the market, and, in all likelihood, it could collapse under its own weight. As the
18th century model is a formula for government that holds in abeyance those vexatious ele-
ments of society by balancing polity and economy with government restrictions, so too is the
international securities market a mechanism by which to encompass the sometimes inimical
financial pursuits and regulations of nations, which foster or inhibit multinational opportunities
for generating wealth and capital. In theory, it is applying the microcosmic 18th century
model on the macrocosmic scale of the international market.
73. Hasteline, International Regulation of Securities Markets: Interaction Between U.S.
and Foreign Laws, 36 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 307, 328 (1987) [hereinafter Hasteline].
74. Id.
75. The financial revolution occurred in the United States when the securities markets
were deregulated. Similarly, the liberalization policy is still happening in Japan, as the ex-
change there opens its market to foreigners. Stock market reform in the shape of government
revamping monetary policies, deregulation and modernization of capital markets is also occur-
ring on many smaller exchanges. These include: the Paris Stock Exchange (the French Parlia-
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1. Big Bang-U.K.-The United Kingdom was one of the first
exchanges to alter its traditional customs of working within the fi-
nancial services sector, and move into the international arena. In the
1970's, the British Parliament passed The Restrictive Trades Prac-
tices legislation, which was later extended to service industries by
legislative order. 6 The law required the Director of the Office of
Fair Trading (OFT) "to refer all registered agreements to the Re-
strictive Practices Court for a ruling on whether or not the restric-
tions in the agreement are against the public interest." '77 Initially,
the London Stock Exchange asked for an exemption; however, it
later acquiesced to a "series of changes in its rules."'78 Thus, with
some prompting from the government, the impetus for change was
the first step toward participation in the international market.
The London Stock Exchange's entry into the international arena
was also, in part, initiated to gain a greater share of the world mar-
ket.79 Otherwise, as one proponent noted, "we would have lost our
business to Tokyo or New York." 80 In short, London serves as the
middle link between East and West to facilitate twenty-four hour
trading.
2. Twenty-four Hour Trading-Globalization of Trad-
ing.-Twenty-four hour trading is the means by which globalization
of financial markets is establishing, in effect, a unitary world ex-
change. Japan, fourteen hours ahead of New York, opens the day's
trading based on New York's closing prices until London awakens to
begin buying and selling based on the Japanese transactions. The
Japanese exchange has opened trading nine hours earlier, and in ad-
vance of New York trading, which opens five hours later, to finish
ment approved a basic structural reform law on December 20, 1987, which went into effect
January 22, 1988); the Netherlands' four exchanges (the Dutch Government has submitted
the Supervision of Securities Traffic Bill to its Parliament to balance statutory regulation and
self regulation); the Danish Stock Exchange (the Reform Act was termed the "Little Big
Bang); and in Belgium, Finland, Luxemburg, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Pacific Basin.
76. Edmonds, Research Note: No. 304-"The Big Bang, House of Commons Library
Research Div., at 1, (Oct. 10, 1986) [hereinafter Edmonds].
77. Id.
78. Id. at 4. These changes included, ending minimum commission fees, admitting lay-
member to the exchange, organizing a new appeal body, changing membership on the existing
appeals committee, and, most notably, eliminating "single capacity-the separation of the
functions of stockbrokers and jobbers." Id.
79. Edmonds, Research Note: No. 384-Financial Life After Big Bang, House of Com-
mons Library Research Div., at 17, (Jan. 21, 1988).
80. Id. These changes facilitated increased competition, elimination of fixed commis-
sions, and London's continued presence in the world market for securities and finance. Id. at 1.
If these changes had not been implemented, London would have continued to decline, as its
market capital resources were rapidly becoming insufficient to meet the growing world de-
mands and changing circumstances. Id. at 9. Interestingly, if the United States does not revise
the Glass-Steagall Act to allow commercial banks to actively participate in the financial mar-
kets, the London Exchange hopes to capture the business, as United States banks go abroad to
foreign markets through their (foreign) subsidiaries. Id.
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one and one-half days' worth of transactions within a twenty-four
hour period."1 Each exchange is dependent on the one opening before
it to establish the day's initial bid price for equities.8 2
Another aspect of twenty-four hour trading is clearance. The
Options Clearing Corporation (OCC) filed a proposed rule change
with the SEC to authorize the creation and development of an Inter-
national Clearing System (ICS), which is "designed to accommodate
trading of OCC-cleared products worldwide on a twenty-four hour
basis." 3 The OCC's proposal states that:
[T]he increasing internationalization of securities markets
has caused extended trading hours due to:
(1) The trading of the same securities in two or
more markets located in different time zones, and
(2) extended trading hours in domestic markets
that are intended to coincide with business hours in for-
eign markets.
OCC believes that eventually some OCC-cleared products
will be traded somewhere in the world 24 hours a day. To ac-
commodate those expected trading hours, OCC has designed
ICS, a new clearing system for a trading day that begins at
about 7:00 pm Eastern Time, and which would continue until as
late as 4:00 pm on the following business day.84
Finally, the NASDAQ is marketing a "unified trade quotation sys-
tem"8 5 to provide a constant international link."6
81. Leibler, A Bigger Slice From the Big Apple, 1 GLOBAL INVEST. MGMT. 178 (Sum-
mer 1988).
82. One investment house is already capitalizing on the information gleaned from trad-
ing in earlier foreign sessions before the opening bell of the N.Y.S.E. The company's trading
book is sent to Tokyo to record the day's trading trends and movements, is shipped to the
London office where more information is added, and finally to New York. There is a "detailed
color (background) of what has taken place in the Tokyo and London market." Hunter, The
Status and Evolution of Twenty-Four Hour Trading. A Traders Views of International
Transactions, Clearance, and Settlement, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 15, 17 (1986) [hereinafter
Hunter].
Other banks and brokerage houses use satellite and landline technology to transmit infor-
mation around the world. Although beyond the scope of this inquiry, some of the global com-
munication technology currently available includes: BBN Communications' pack switching
networks (an internal computer link-up), Reuters' Integrated Data Network (IDN) (a storage,
incoming and outgoing world quotation database), touch-screens, on screen dealing via
Reuters' Instinet Service, and Cruising Network (an automated trading system that adjusts a
portfolio via matching buy/sell orders by executing and clearing transactions at day's closing
price). These new developments are rapidly creating a direct global electronic exchange. Jones,
Passing the Book Around the World, I GLOBAL INVEST. MGMT. 287-92 (Summer 1988).
83. Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-24891 (Sept. 9, 1987) [hereinafter S.E.A.R. 34-24891].
84. Id.
85. Hunter, supra note 82, at 23. One exchange principal notes that:
The NASDAQ market is also a major force in the continuing development
of the 24-hour globtl equity market. Its automated system links dealers over
large distances through their computer screens and represents a modern alterna-
tive to the centralized floors of the established stock exchanges. The decentral-
ized NASDAQ structure of multiple dealers, or market makers, in equities is
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3. Pilot Programs.-Different programs throughout the world
have been implemented to foster, at first, bilateral coordination of
markets to prevent price and rule disparities. Harmonizing world ex-
changes encourages market liquidity and attempts to reconcile diver-
gent national regulatory schemes and surveillance practices, allowing
free market forces to operate unimpaired. Over a period of two
years, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD)
has filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sev-
eral proposed rules changes to allow the development of pilot 7 pro-
grams that first opened up international markets, and second, main-
tained a degree of transnational central control and oversight by the
SEC.
a. International Stock Exchange.-The first step toward coor-
dinating foreign markets with the United States exchanges was out-
lined in a proposed rule change by the NASD to the SEC. Under
the NASD proposal, they requested the implementation of a Pilot
Program that allowed an interchange of information about selected
international securities to occur between the NASD and the Interna-
tional Stock Exchange located in London.8  This "encourages
broader participation by international dealers, enhances opportuni-
ties for directing orders to the market offering the best prices, im-
proves liquidity in the markets for eligible securities, and promotes
complimentary enhancements to international clearance and settle-
ment processes." ' In short, NASD acts as a vendor of information
collected outside the traditional marketplace, and then disseminates
it to a myriad of interested recipients. 90
seen by many as creating a market mechanism with more competition, greater
capital support, higher liquidity, and superior sponsorship of stocks, compared to
the traditional, single-specialist system of the exchanges. When the international
stock-exchange in London restructured itself during Big Bang of 1986, it did so
along NASDAQ lines, with an automated system known as SEAQ (Stock Ex-
change Automated Quotations) and competing dealers. Likewise, Singapore has
created the SESDAQ (Stock Exchange of Singapore Dealing and Automated
Quotations) system and also operates with multiple market makers.
Hardiman, The International NASDAQ Market, I GLOBAL INVEST. MGMT. 171 (Summer
1988).
86. Wall Street Goes Global, U.S. NEW & W. REP. Mar. 24, 1986, at 57.
87. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
88. Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-24364 (April 17, 1987).
89. Id.
90. The information is distributed free to NASDAQ market makers and Exchange deal-
ers who trade the quoted securities. Others pay a subscription fee to the NASD's National
Quotation Data Service (NQDS) or the Exchange's CRS Data Services. The information dis-
played has to be "of sufficient value and integrity to warrant processing by the marketplace for
dissemination to the world through a diverse network of information procedures." This will
make the marketplace more efficient and economical by "linking two world marketplaces
through the application of technology. The linkage constitutes an important step toward the
establishment of regulatory programs of mutual benefit, the expansion of trading opportunities
both here and abroad, the provision of more efficient markets and economic incentives to direct
order (systems) in linked securities to the best available market." Id.
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The objective of the International Stock Exchange Pilot Pro-
gram includes:
[T]wo-way dissemination of last sale reports in selected se-,
curities; linkage of the respective small order processing systems;
development of a composite display of market makers' quotes
from both market centers; and development of an automated
confirmation procedure that will yield locked-in trades to facili-
tate clearance and settlement."
In essence, the Program links both domestic and foreign securities
exchanges via transatlantic communication networks, enabling ana-
lysts on both sides of the ocean to examine international trading
trends and opportunities.9" The NASD has applied for and received
approval of another pilot program to link Far-East markets.
b. Singapore.-On October 7, 1987, a second Pilot Program
was proposed by the NASD with the SEC to authorize the imple-
mentation of a system that links New York with the Stock Exchange
of Singapore (SES).93 This Pilot Program was scheduled to be fully
operational by December 1, 1987 for a two-year trial term."' Due to
a thirteen hour time difference, "the end-of-day information to be
exchanged under the Pilot Program will mainly assist in establishing
opening prices the following day." 98
The first phase of the Program is limited to the "collection and
dissemination of final trading information on thirty-five NASDAQ
stocks9" after the close of trading in each market"-SES and NAS-
DAQ.9 7 The program is designed to create a new foreign equities
market modeled after the NASDAQ system."" In turn, this will fa-cilitate the development of a Singapore dealer market in the thirty-
five listed securities "while the NASDAQ market is closed." 99
"Hence, the Pilot linkage consists of two daily transmissions of static
information, one by each market, after the close of the respective
91. Id.
92. Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-24544 (June 7, 1987). This Pilot Program has been the
subject of many SEC Releases. See SR-NASD-86-4; SR-NASD-86-26, SR-NASD-86-35,
SR-NASD-87-15, SR-NASD-87-20, and SR-NASD-87-24.
93. Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-25065 (Oct. 28, 1987).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. The information to be interchanged is limited to the thirty-five NASDAQ stocks
selected to participate in the Pilot. This trading news includes:
1. the closing quote of each market makers;
2. the closing inside market;
3. the last reported sale (for NASDAQ/NMS issues); and
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SES and NASDAQ markets in the subject securities."' 0
The objective of the Program is to "significantly improve the
competitive dynamics of the international markets for these securi-
ties" by linking the New York and Singapore Exchanges.' 0' More-
over, both markets have agreed to coordinate regulatory activities
and interchange information related to such practices.0 2 Using this
Program to establish opening share prices provides for a coordinated,
more stable world market. This constitutes an early attempt at an
international regulatory scheme.
B. Regulation
The manner by which the financial markets are organized to
allow the free flow of capital on an international scale also needs to
be addressed. The process is complex, and problems abound when
one nation attempts to regulate outside its own borders. Although
there are many equivalent practices between nations, there are as
many differences.' This new trend toward internationalization de-
mands that regulators be extremely reflective of international needs
and trends, and lines of demarcation clearly set forth.
1. SEC.-Regulation in the United States is founded on a
strong central regulatory body: the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC). 0 The Commission attempts to balance the need to
expand the international role of investment in and investment by the
American financial community with Congress' desire for complete
disclosure.0 3 There has been a plethora of SEC letters and re-
leases,' 6 concerning different methods by which to achieve a balance




103. Merloe, supra note 71, at 265-67.
104. Hasteline, supra note 73, at 307. For a thorough examination of United States
securities laws and regulations, see H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 1.
105. Hasteline, supra note 73, at 307. (This article discusses "some of the ramifications
of participation in international securities transactions, giving particular emphasis to the view
of United States courts in this respect.") Id.
106. SEC Release No. 33-6568 proposes uniform requirements that, in turn, facilitate
multinational securities offerings. For a discussion of its faults and merits see Lorenz, supra
note 70, at 795-808. Other SEC releases and letters that have also considered this issue in-
clude: Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-25322 (Feb. 5, 1988); Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 33-6754
(Feb. 7, 1988); Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 25065 (Oct. 28, 1987); Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. IC-
16049 (Oct. 14, 1987); Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34024979 (Oct. 2, 1987); Sec. Exch. Act Rel.
No. 34-24891 (Sept. 9, 1987); Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-24862 (Aug. 28, 1987); Sec. Exch.
Act Rel. No. 34-24891 (Aug. 21, 1987); Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-24832 (Aug. 21, 1987);
Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-24544 (Je. 3, 1987); Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-24475 (May 19,
1987); Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-24364 (Apr. 17, 1978); Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-24292
(Apr. 2, 1987); Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 33-6690 (Feb. 13, 1987); Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-
23952 (Jan. 5, 1987); and assorted SEC letters filed during 1988 and 1989.
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foreign issuers with requirements that necessitate unfamiliar prac-
tices.10 7 To complicate matters, the "various domestic markets of the
world are at extremely divergent stages of development,"10  and
there is a need to reconcile the fundamentally incompatible parts.109
Regulating foreign access and protecting American investors,
however, is only one piece of the puzzle. The capital markets them-
selves are also "shaped by sometimes strikingly different needs, in-
terests, traditions and institutions."' 10 Generally, regulatory and cap-
ital market problems can be broken down into four categories: (1)
execution, 1  (2) clearance and settlement,1 2  (3) manipulation, 13
and (4) insiders.114 To mitigate some of these problems, one com-
mentator argues that there should be an "expansion of the national
regulatory system to transnational transactions," broader "interna-
tional cooperation" between States, 1 5 "and where international co-
107. Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 33-6779 is the first attempt by the commission to propose
a rule reconciling the 1933 Act's registration requirements and international transactions in
nearly 25 years. 20 SRLR 912 (Je. 17, 1988). The proposed rule states that:
[t]he regulation would provide generally that any offer or sale that occurs
within the United States is subject to Section 5 of the Securities Act and any
offer or sale that occurs outside the United States is not subject to Section 5.
The Regulation would set forth facts considered important in determining
whether an offer or sale occurs outside the United States. Additionally, the Reg-
ulation would provide "safe harbors" for specified transactions. Offers and sales
meeting all of the conditions of the applicable safe harbors would be deemed to
be outside the United States and, therefore, not subject to Section 5. The Regu-
lation, as proposed, would not be available with respect to offers and sales of
securities issued by investment companies required to register under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940.
17 CFR § 230, 20 SRLR § 952 (1988).
108. Hasteline, supra note 73, at 309.
109. Id.
110. Kubler, Regulatory Problems In Internationalizing Trade Markets, 4 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 107 (1987) [hereinafter Kubler]. For an interesting analysis of the similarities and differ-
ences between the United States and the United Kingdom disclosure requirements and the
present status of foreign issuers in the United States, and the feasibility of transatlantic mul-
tinational offerings, see Lorenz, supra note 70, at 796, and Merloe, supra note 71, at 249.
I11. This problem centers on the different systems relaying information about current
prices and execution of orders. Kubler, supra note 110, at Ill.
112. In this instance, the focus is on the lapse of time that naturally occurs between buy
and sell transmissions between countries and the resulting obligations incurred by participants
to each contract. Id.
113. Regulation in this area attempts to extend rule lOb-6 to foreign transactions that
are used to manipulate domestic prices. Id. at 112. For instance, an investor may use a tech-
nique that the SEC deems illegal, but a foreign exchange does not, in order to manipulate the
market and drive up the price of a stock on the American market. By using legal manipulative
practices in London, an investor may drive up the value of stock A. When New York opens,
market makers will only see that stock A has been active and moved higher in London trading,
thus the specialist opens trading on stock A at a higher price as the foreign investor sells off
holdings. The manipulation is difficult to discover when it occurs overseas. Yet, it still affects
the United States market, giving international players something of an unfair advantage over
less sophisticated investors.
114. An "effective mechanism of enforcement needs to be used to prevent the circum-
stance of national rules against insider trading through the use of foreign financial institutions
or trading on extraterritorial securities markets." Id.
115. The SEC submitted to Congress the "International Securities Enforcement Act of
1988" (S 2544 & HR 4945) to expand their enforcement authority when asked to participate
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operation is troublesome," an increase in laws and regulations.11
Much has been written in this area discussing the intricacies of
international regulation by a domestic agency. 17 In 1985, the SEC
proposed three different concept releases: (1) a general appraisal," 8
(2) waiver by conduct," 9 and (3) a comment prospectus. 20 To date,
none of these proposals have been implemented.
2. World (foreign).-The regulation of securities worldwide
presents a challenge.' Yet, regulators can profit from their collec-
tive experience in regulating their own domestic markets.' 22 As the
international market moves closer to a unified exchange, national
legislation will be superseded by an international regulatory scheme.
Otherwise, the multiplicity of domestic rules will impede an efficient
market. Thus, world securities regulation will primarily focus on the
following areas: "(1) the distribution of securities, (2) listing and re-
porting requirements, (3) takeovers and acquisitions, (4) proxy regu-
lation, (5) insider trading, and (6) regulation of securities
professionals.' 23
The objective of an international scheme is to foster the "cen-
in an investigation conducted by a foreign country. Previously, the Commission was limited
both in its scope and to only possible violations of United States law. The proposal "would
provide the SEC with the authority, at its discretion, to conduct investigations it deems neces-
sary to collect information and evidence for a foreign authority that has asked for help." 20
SRLR 667-8 (May 6, 1988). This legislation came as a response to an agreement with Cana-
dian Securities officials in January 1988. Id. Subsequently, Brazil signed a similar memoran-
dum. 20 SRLR 1059 (July 8, 1988).
116. Kubler, supra note 110, at 112. On another front, the U.S. Commodity Futures
and Trading Commission (CFTC) and Britain's Securities and Investment Board (SIB) have
agreed to closer border cooperation. The CFTC will now police a great deal of London's secur-
ities business. In fact, the American National Future Association will supersede the SIB and
unprecedentedly be given jurisdiction over disputes between British firms and American cli-
ents. The Economist, Overbearing and Overthere (Mar. 18, 1989) at 88.
117. See Kubler, supra note I10.
118. Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 21-958 [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,759 (April 18, 1985), which questions the internationalization of securities markets.
119. Kubler, supra note 110, at 113. "It is deemed that one who trades in the United
States has submitted himself to be bound by United States laws, including discovery." Id.
120. Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 33-6568, 50 Fed. Reg. 9281 (1985).
121. A comparison, however, of the various regulatory approaches is beyond the scope of
this writing. But see Kubler, supra note 110.
122. H, BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 1, at 1-61. The SEC issued a policy statement call-
ing for multinational agreements in order to achieve a world market system. It stated that:
[Ain effective (world) market system should include the following: (1) effi-
cient structures for price, quotation, and volume information, order routing, or-
der execution, clearance, settlement, and payment, as well as strong capital ade-
quacy standards; (2) sound disclosure systems, including accounting, auditing,
and auditing independence standards, as well as registration, prospectus, and
listing standards; and (3) fair and honest markets.
20 SRLR 1753 (Nov. 18, 1988).
123. H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 1, at 1-64. This list, however, is not inclusive, and
there are other less prominent subjects worthy of attention and scrutiny. For example, the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) developed "a detailed inven-
tory of technical and regulatory problems related to multinational offerings." 20 SRLR 1066
(July 8, 1988).
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tralization or integration of the world's markets. 1 24 This will facili-
tate the "efficient allocation of capital and (promote) economic pro-
gress throughout the world. ' 125 One commentator argues that this
can occur by the international adoption of "uniform minimum stan-
dards" (UMS). 126 This would include uniform disclosure require-
ments and international accounting standards, and the organization
of an international regulatory body. 12 7 Harold Bloomenthal writes
that:
[T]he protection of investors in foreign securities will ulti-
mately depend upon the existence of a network of strong regula-
tory bodies capable of administering and enforcing local securi-
ties laws. Necessarily joined with effective and harmonious local
regulation must be agreements for reciprocal regulatory and en-
forcement activities among participating countries."'
The financial markets have had the opportunity to grow freely with-
out being plagued by overinclusive regulations. Symmetry has been
maintained by both the SEC and world exchanges themselves with-
out stifling economic growth and expansion. When the advancement
impinges on the good of the whole, purposeful constraints should be,
and are being, erected to check exploitation: in effect, the
Hamiltonian theorem.
IV. Reclaiming a Patrimony: An Eighteenth Century Solution to a
Twenty-first Century Dilemma
At its inception, the Hamiltonian paradigm was in part shaped
by the dialogue that occurred between the Federalist and the Anti-
Federalist. 12 '9 The political and economic life of the community was
124. H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 1, at 2-50.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2-48.
127. Id. at 2-49. Former SEC Chairman David Ruder argued in a lecture September
26, 1988, that securities regulators worldwide needed "to develop a coherent and coordinated
approach to market regulation." 20 SRLR 1480 (Sept. 30, 1988). He cited three principle
issues: (1) "the need for efficient and compatible automated national and international clear-
ance and settlement systems in the international marketplace;" (2) "the importance of coordi-
nated accounting procedures" and (3) a territorial approach regarding "the application of
United States registration requirements to overseas offerings." Id. at 1480-81.
128. H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 1, at 2-50. For an interesting discussion of the "frag-
ile nature of international securities regulation," see Id. at 1-147-1-155.
129. One author explains that:
The Anti-Federalist dissented from the view that popular government or
republicanism was possible in a vast extent of territory and under an energetic
central government. The main reason for this belief, taken from Montesquieu,
was that republicanism was possible only with public-spirited or virtuous citi-
zens. Republican citizens had to be imbued with the "love of the laws of the
country;" they had to exhibit "a constant preference of public to private inter-
est." Only an alert, public-spirited citizenry, they believed, would give that
amount of attention to public affairs that self-government or republicanism truly
required."
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debated publicly, and in turn, established an important foundation
by which the polity addressed and assessed issues. 30 In the colloquy
about competing paradigms, the excesses of the nineteenth 3' and
twentieth 32  centuries present an interesting contrast to the
Hamiltonian formula 3 3 and, in essence, are "Anti-Federalists" to
the eighteenth century paradigm.
Restated, the Hamiltonian formula is expressed as: democracy
equals polity plus economy less restrictions. As commercial expan-
sion occurs, political stability is enhanced and factions quieted, and
as political stability develops, economic expansion is fostered. The
balance of the equation hinges on the degree to which government
interferes via regulation. Learning from hindsight, the nineteenth
and Twentieth centuries placed tremendous emphasis on either econ-
omy or government restrictions to achieve balance. In each century,
one element of the equation dominated all others. In both periods,
community consensus did not serve as a guide to pursue economic
activities.'3 4 Thus, it is evident that democracy is served best when
the elements have equal weight and influence.
Application of the eighteenth century formula is evidenced in
the international securities market. In the United States, government
regulation occurs as a reaction to exchange practices rather than as
a preordained agenda set out by the "Fourth Branch" of govern-
ment.133 It is difficult to issue commands, disguised as laws, to
achieve a grandiose "state substantive purpose" in the international
financial sector. By definition, the nature of the equities market is
such that it is difficult to formulate rules in anticipation of some type
Roots of Public Philosophy, supra note 25, at 23.
130. Id. at 74.
131. In this instance, the excess was not one of limitation but abstention; in essence,
nonintervention despite the need to maintain symmetry. See supra notes 40-51 and accompa-
nying text.
132. The excesses of the 20th century were the result of the federal government's "mas-
sive all out effort to extend the American system of political economy far beyond the limits of
what was possible." Miller, supra note 16, at 76. See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying
text.
133. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
134. Although beyond the scope of this inquiry, it would be interesting to examine
whether the Hamiltonian revival has been extended to the socioeconomic dilemma that the
nation has been facing since the 1930's. Simply, whether social values have again become the
catalyst behind economic activity. Whether the question "Is it capitalistic?" has been replaced
by the question "Does it work?" and support the values and goals of the polity? See Zoll,
supra note 13, at 7.
135. One author notes that:
There is nothing inherently wrong with ameliorative action from govern-
ment. However, the instinct of modern government, and especially of liberal ad-
ministrations, is to protect all client groups from all discomforts of change. Mod-
ern governments often are reactionary. They react against change. And they are
schizophrenic reactionaries: They divide their energies between fostering eco-
nomic dynanism and resisting the logic of dynanism.
G. WILL, supra note 31, at 167.
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of undesirable practice; regulation occurs slowly, and generally after
a substantial period of comment by the financial community. New
financial products, including the technology used to implement, and
methods by which to market them, on-going changes occurring at
international exchanges-both as to regulation and organization, and
the ease by which to move instantaneously an incredible percentage
of total United States GNP around the world from financial market
to financial market all inhibits anticipatory regulation. Invariably,
the SEC is forced to wait and see what the rocket-scientists will de-
velop next. The approach is bottom up rather than top down. This
encourages both risk taking and imagination by financial experts.
The rapid growth and development of the international equities
market, and the inherent problem of regulation across national
boundaries has prevented overregulation. Further, regulators recog-
nize that overrestriction of the international market will only drive
business into the hands of foreign competition;136 thus, change and
restraint are approached with caution. The trend is "both philosoph-
ically and politically toward deregulation of markets. ' ' 137 This "per-
mits free market forces to determine the way,"' 8 but still allows
room for purposeful government intervention to check exploitative
practices.
The ability to generate capital in foreign markets, and the in-
creased participation by foreign investors in American exchanges has
expanded commerce. This development will be further facilitated by
government that encourages a progressive economy. Conversely, it
will be eroded if unpurposeful intervention is allowed to inhibit ex-
pansion and distort community-understood strictures. The goal, as
always, is symmetry, balancing free market principles and the "min-
dless compulsion to legislate" to achieve a progressive economy that
cultivates both liberty and democracy. In effect, the SEC delineates
the parameters of civil association that allows enterprise association,
in this case the financial community, to pursue its objectives. The
rule of law remains fairly constant and predictable."3 9
136. This was the main impetus behind London's Big Bang. Otherwise, customers would
turn to another exchange that could accommodate their financial needs.
137. Debs, The Development of International Equities Markets, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 5, 7
(1986). "This trend is visible in the United States [and the] United Kingdom, [and] for differ-
ent reasons in Japan. The object is to remove restraints on competition, and philosophically
this applies to foreign competition as well as domestic so that market forces will work." Id. at
7.
138. Id. at 5.
139. Although the echoes to bring program traders before the kind for execution in Oc-
tober, 1987, (and, again in October 1989) encouraged a knee jerk reaction that argued for a
multitude of reforms, changes have only been slight. The result has mostly been limited to
"headline grabbing" public hearings by members of Congress, and pounds of bureaucratic
studies, and those proposals that were implemented have, for the most part, not adversely
effected the free market system.
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At present, American participation in the international securi-
ties market is growing rapidly due to the balanced eighteenth cen-
tury approach taken by the SEC.14 Participants want to promote
internationalization and are reluctant to throw up any but the most
necessary barriers in order to maintain full disclosure. Thus, whether
noticed or not, the international securities market utilizes the
Hamiltonian paradigm.
The financial revival bankrupts the theory that America is des-
tined to fall headlong toward a "relative decline. ' 141 Indeed, it serves
as a successful reminder of how commercial expansion can further
economic growth when supported by unintrusive government. 42
Broader application of the formula to industry can achieve the same
result.1 1 3 The excessive regulation of the bureaucracy must be throt-
tled in order to encourage industrial growth. In turn, this will enable
the United States to once again step forward as a primary economic
leader of the world in the twenty-first century.
V. Conclusion
The international market has reclaimed a patrimony, and ap-
plied an eighteenth century solution to a twenty-first century quan-
140. This is not to say, however, that this has been a deliberate approach by the SEC or
securities market to build an international market by balancing government and economy.
Indeed, it has been as much a part of business convention as a little bit of luck. Interestingly,
one commentator notes that:
The health and vigor of a nation's securities markets have long been consid-
ered reliable indicators of that nation's economic strength. The principal reason
is that securities markets function as a primary means for private entrepreneurs
to acquire the long-term risk capital used in development of new and better
products, improved services, and advanced technology - all of which is essential
to economic growth and stability.
H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 1, at 2-4-2-5. Moreover, the international market has increased
the opportunities available to obtain various types of financing, as capital is no longer limited
to select people or certain amounts. For the consumer, many financial service companies now
offer investment products that speculate in and attempt to capitalize on foreign markets.
141. This thesis is unconvincingly presented in P. KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
GREAT POWERS; ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (1988).
142. William Schneider writes that:
The role of government is the eternal issue in American politics. An eco-
nomically activist federal government is one that manages, guides, and regulates
the economy. Is that liberal or conservative? In the nineteenth century, when
government was regarded as bastion of privilege, the out-groups of society fa-
vored a laissez-faire state. Jacksonion Democrats ... opposed many forms of
government economic intervention, such as a national bank, incorporated
through legislative charter, and even government-sponsored internal improve-
ments. The Federalists, and the Radical Republicans were more comfortable
with statism and government intervention (for instance, Henry Clay's "Ameri-
can System"), which they defended in the name of nationalism.
G. WILL, supra note 31, at 169, (quoting Schneider, The New Shape of American Politics,
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1987, at 50.).
143. "Americans [are] trying to define the appropriate government response to the fact
that freedom and capitalism involve choices and casualties." G. WILL, supra note 31, at 169.
Moreover, this entails an assessment of "the communities obligations to its members who are
hurt by capitalism's dynanism." Id.
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dary. The expansion of commerce results in political stability, and a
secure polity encourages increased commercial development, thus re-
ducing the natural propensity of government founded on democratic
principles from suffering a violent death. A reclamation by Ameri-
can industry and government is the beginning of a pivotal transition
period for the United States, and will bolster the nation as it enters
the twenty-first century.

